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REMARKS OF MICHAEL REBELL
I am honored to be participating in the celebration of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education.' For me, it
is also an occasion to celebrate the much more recent decision of
the New York Court of Appeals in Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. New York, 2 (CFE) which was handed down last June.
Before I discuss this important decision, I would like to say
something about the court of appeals' preliminary 1995 decision
in this case. 3 It was a case in which Dean Bellacosa played an
important role. In essence, the court in its earlier decision
denied a motion to dismiss that would have cut off all future
possibility of continuing this type of litigation. Some may say
that the early decision ("CFE I') was merely a technical legal
journey en route to a much larger and ultimately more
significant decision on the merits ("CFE I'). Still, I would like
to begin my discussion with CFE I because it embodies the
theme I want to discuss with respect to how CFE II and the
other education adequacy decisions relate to Brown and its
implementation.
Let me take you back a few years to 1993. At the time I was
not a young lawyer, but a younger lawyer, and a client of mine at
the time was a gentleman by the name of Bob Jackson. Mr.
Jackson was the chairperson of one of the community school
boards in New York City at a time when schools in New York
were facing severe cutbacks that were leading to layoffs of
teachers and dramatic reductions in services. He was extremely
distressed by this situation. Mr. Jackson was convinced that
New York City was not getting its fair share of state education
funding, and he insisted that I bring a lawsuit.
While I agreed that the state education formula was totally
unfair to New York City, I explained to him that unfortunately
somebody had already brought suit challenging the state
f Executive Director, Campaign for Fiscal Equity.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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education finance system. A number of years ago, a group of
property-poor districts on Long Island filed Board of Education,
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist 4 (Levittown).
Despite winning an initial victory in the lower court, the court of
appeals reversed and firmly held that there is no constitutional
right under the New York State Constitution to fiscal equity in
education. I told Mr. Jackson that with a major constitutional
claim a lawyer can not easily go back to that same court barely a
decade later with a very similar case.
Mr. Jackson, on the other hand, would not take no for an
answer. He was adamant in his belief that there was an
inequity in regard to state funding for the New York City schools
and that ultimately, if we pushed hard enough, justice would
prevail in the courts. Now, why do I bring this to your attention
in connection with our discussion of Brown? I mention it
because the vision of equal educational opportunity that
motivated Bob Jackson to make that kind of statement was the
same vision behind Brown. And his belief that the courts are the
place in our society where ultimately issues of justice and equity
would be resolved is the same faith in the legal system that
motivated the Brown plaintiffs. We had been to the legislature
with all its wheeling, dealing, and backroom politics. Quite
frankly, with respect to school funding issues, in the legislature I
believe there was still a significant amount of racist attitudes
present as well. The only place that the core principles at issue
would be fairly considered was in the courts.
Jackson's passion and insistence motivated me to research
developments in similar constitutional cases that had been
decided by state courts in other jurisdictions. When I started the
research, I saw an emerging trend toward a new theory of
education adequacy in these cases, which was distinct from the
equal protection arguments that had been presented to the New
York Court of Appeals. I satisfied myself that this distinct
theory would allow us to file a claim that would not be regarded
as a frivolous case. I then knew that I could at least bring the
case in good conscience as an officer of the court and argue that
there was a serious issue that warranted the court's careful
attention. We did just that; the case reached the court of appeals
and the court distinguished Levittown. The case went to trial,
4 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
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and Judge Bellacosa was one of the five-member-majority in the
case that accepted the distinction between our new education
adequacy claim and the equal protection claims in Levittown and
denied the motion to dismiss.
As an aside I would note that sometimes in the literature on
judicial activism, there are assertions that most novel Civil
Rights claims emerge from the heads of law professors and legal
advocates. The model is that a bright young lawyer with some
new theory wants to test it, so she goes running around to find
some plaintiff who will put his name on it. In my case, I can
assure you, it was quite the opposite. Jackson was an insistent
client who would not take no for an answer and who forced me to
do research to find out what was happening in other states.
With that as background, I would like to step back and
speak in broader terms about the significance of this nationwide
Education Advocacy Movement. It is an amazing chapter in the
history of state court constitutional law. Litigation of this type
has taken place over the past thirty years in forty-four of the
fifty states. Plaintiffs have won victories in over twenty-five of
those states, and in an increasing number in recent years. How
many of you remember the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez?5 When one looks back thirty years, it is apparent
that the federal courts had closed their doors to litigation
involving fiscal equity in education. In Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court held that fiscal inequities in the funding of public
education was not a matter that rose to the level of a
fundamental interest under the federal Constitution. Therefore,
the federal courts were not going to involve themselves in these
potentially thorny cases. The decision seemed to mark a bleak
day for those of us who were active in education advocacy at that
time because Rodriguez was seen as the next major phase of the
education revolution.
Rodriguez, we hoped, would be the
culmination of the implementation of Brown.
As Professor Greenberg mentioned, there were great
difficulties in implementing Brown in the years immediately
following the Supreme Court's ruling. Largely, it involved the
racism, and the political resistance that emerged from the
political culture of the time. At the same time, the concept of

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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educational opportunity and a real sense of urgency resounded
through the briefs in Brown. Leaders like Thurgood Marshall
expected that if they won a legal victory in Brown within a few
short years, all the schools throughout the country would be
open to black children. Sadly, though, relatively little attention
was paid at the time to what would happen inside those schools
once the doors were opened, and whether merely opening the
doors was going to be enough to provide a truly equal
educational opportunity for these children. To be sure, these
particular children had a great deal to overcome in light of the
educational deficiencies they had suffered, the disadvantages
they had in the economics of their lives, and the whole range of
socioeconomic backgrounds that came with a century of
oppression and poverty as well as enduring the legacies of
slavery.
In the 1960s, the country slowly came to realize that a
crucial component of the implementation of Brown would be a
very fundamental resource question. The black schools in the
South were not only segregated, but they also were totally
starved of any fair modicum of resources. These schools had
huge classes, facilities that were falling apart, the teachers were
inadequately prepared, and usually these schools received old
textbooks when the white schools received the new editions. It
was a horrendous situation, and this lack of resources
increasingly came to the fore of the discrepancy between
educational opportunities for black and white children. Even
when these children managed to get into an integrated school,
they were usually being integrated into the poorest schools
which also had terrible resource deficiencies. In short, the
resources were wholly inadequate to provide the affirmative
educational opportunities that were necessary to overcome
legacies of disadvantage and slavery.
This was the unfortunate climate in which Rodriguez arose.
So many hopes were tied to that decision because many
advocates expected it to be the case to hold that fair access to
resources is a mandatory part of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution. In Texas at that time, as in most states, the
inequities in education finance stemmed largely from the
property tax base of public school financing. In Rodriguez, the
children who lived in the poor plaintiff district were receiving
half as much money per capita as children in the neighboring
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district.
Paradoxically, the taxpayers in the poor minority
district paid 25% higher taxes, despite the fact that their
children received only half as much funding. Notably, these
calculations even took into account the extra federal funding and
extra state funding.
The disparities were huge.
People,
therefore, thought that these facts were so overwhelming that
the Supreme Court would have to respond positively to them.
The Court acknowledged that the facts presented a problem, but
it nevertheless determined that it would not advance federal
Equal Protection theory to cover this situation.
This brings us to state court constitutionalism. At the time
that the doors to the federal court houses were being closed to
claims for fiscal equity in education, most civil rights attorneys
thought that was probably the end of the road for this type of
claim. The conventional wisdom was that if you were going to
initiate a civil rights action, you had to strategize a way to obtain
federal jurisdiction. Going to state court, it was thought, would
lead inevitably to disaster for civil rights plaintiffs due to the
state courts' general conservatism, their unwillingness to handle
cases of this type, and their overall lack of sufficient resources to
deal with large institutional reform litigations. We all believed
at the time that if you wanted major civil rights breakthroughs,
you had to go to federal court.
After Rodriguez, the federal courthouse doors were shut, and
so some lawyers decided nevertheless to file these claims in state
court because it was their only alternative. To the great
surprise of the civil rights bar, plaintiffs started winning these
cases. As cases were won in California, New Jersey, and West
Virginia, others were started in New York and other states.
Unfortunately, I do not have time to elaborate upon the whole
thirty-year panorama of the development of fiscal equity in
education arguments. Suffice it to say, the state courthouse
doors began to open, and these arguments began to take shape
and effect significant changes.
This openness speaks to a crucial impact of Brown. As
Professor Greenberg explained, Brown gave rise to a farreaching vision of equal educational opportunity. When you look
back historically over the past fifty years, you realize the depth
of what I call a democratic imperative for equal educational
opportunity which Brown unleashed.
Once uncabined, this
vision and this imperative, in my view, is going to prove
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ultimately unstoppable. It will to push until it finds its natural
center of gravity, and that center of gravity is going to be at a
level that is consistent with the very best of democratic
principles.
There is, of course, still substantial backsliding in the courts
and the legislatures in realizing Brown's vision. Nevertheless, I
believe that the momentum of the Brown vision of equal
educational opportunity is incessant and that it will prevail. I
submit that such pressure is what motivated civil rights
attorneys, totally despondent after the loss in Rodriguez, to
continue to push the fiscal equity issue in the state courts. And
ultimately, it is why, I believe, the state courts, despite the
negative predictions at the time, proved highly receptive to these
arguments. Because of the democratic imperative propelled by
Brown, each time there was a setback in the legal direction,
creative attorneys nevertheless insisted on going forward and
would come up with an alternate.
In CFE, we encountered many of these challenges. In
particular, I have mentioned the fact that we had the
unfortunate precedent of the plaintiffs' defeat in Levittown to
confront. Fortunately, we were inspired by an initial plaintiff,
Robert Jackson, who absolutely refused to give up. In fact,
unwavering plaintiffs across the nation became part of a growing
trend in these fiscal equity and educational adequacy cases. In
the first few years after the loss in Rodriguez, the plaintiffs won
almost all of the major battles.
Suddenly, however, in the early 1980s the pendulum began
to swing the other way. There were a lot more filings, but
unexpectedly defendants started to prevail and over-all, during
the '80s, defendants won about two-thirds of the cases, including
Levittown. Ten years later, however, the pendulum swung back,
and if you track the cases from 1989 to 2003, plaintiffs have won
over 70% of them.
So what is going on here with this back-and-forth pendulum
motion? If you look at the fiscal equity cases in broad terms, you
might say that the democratic imperative clearly prevailed in the
first wave of plaintiff victories. The implementation of equal
educational opportunity started there. On the other hand, in
every one of these early cases, after the initial court decrees were
issued, the remedy stage proved difficult. In states like New
Jersey compliance issues have gone back and forth between the
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legislature and the state supreme court more than a dozen and
a half times over the course of three decades. Fortunately, in the
past few years, an effective remedy has finally begun to take
shape in New Jersey. Judges in other states, of course, took heed
of these developments and were not inclined to look forward to
years of contempt motions and inter-institutional battles with
the legislature. Why, then, all of a sudden did things change in
1989? It was at this time that the standards-based reform
movement in education was occurring, a development that itself
might be said to have been motivated in part by the continuing
awareness of the Brown vision. The standards-based reform
movement really had two origins. One of them was rooted in a
business perspective that the nation's schools appeared
mediocre. There was both a real and perceived problem of
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Therefore, improving
the caliber of the school systems seemed an economic imperative.
At the same time, there was also a clear equity concern that
permeated the standards movement from the start. Over-all, the
standards movement proclaimed that the nation could improve
the caliber of its schools by setting definitive standards, which
made clear what was expected of children, and challenging all
children to reach those goals.
In setting these standards, the state education leaders took
the position that the nation could simultaneously achieve both
excellence and equity. They stated that the new challenging
standards were benchmarks that were reasonable for all
children. The nation's educational leaders have repeatedly
stated that every child, black or white, could attain the desired
level of educational attainment, if they were provided sufficient
supports and sufficient opportunity.
The
standards-based
reform
movement,
therefore,
reinvigorated educational reform and reinvigorated the quest for
equal educational opportunity. Looking at it from the judicial
perspective, this reform movement also provided judges
manageable standards for dealing with the remedy stage of a
fiscal equity lawsuit. The education standards promulgated by
state education departments provided a clear vision of what
needed to be done to give all children genuine opportunity. What
the courts needed to do was hold the state leaders' feet to the fire
and compel them to fund the specific types of reforms that they
themselves had determined were necessary and appropriate.
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The shift in legal theory from equity claims based on equal
protection concepts to education adequacy claims based on
substantive language in individual state constitutions that
guaranteed all students some basic level of adequate education
also was substantially aided by the standards movement. These
education clauses which guaranteed all children a "thorough and
efficient" education or a "sound basic education" had been
written into state constitutions a century or more earlier. In
most cases they emerged during the nineteenth century battles
to establish "common schools" and codified the victory of the
democratic forces that established the nation's public school
systems. But as substantive judicial concepts, these clauses lay
dormant for over a hundred years because they could not easily
be translated into pragmatic legal doctrines.
What is a
"thorough and efficient" or a "sound basic education?' How could
courts deal with these vague terms.
Here again, the standard-based reform movement made a
real difference. All of a sudden, judges realized that the state
education departments and the highest education policymakers
were clearly articulating what constituted a minimum or an
adequate education.
This gave potential new life to these
archaic, abstract constitutional clauses. A judge deciding one of
these cases now had a handle on what an adequate education
could mean and should mean in contemporary times.
Despite advances, forty years after Brown we still had not
achieved equal educational opportunity. Notwithstanding these
new legal theories and their resonance in state constitutions, the
vision of equal educational opportunity is still a work in
progress. The fact that in the challenges to state education
finance systems, the pendulum did swing back in plaintiffs' favor
in 1989 has brought new energy and new possibilities to Brown's
concept of equal educational opportunity. I think it is highly
significant that in New York, and six other states in the 1990s,
the highest courts reconsidered prior decisions, and despite the
fact that they had denied challenges to state education finance
systems a decade earlier, they were open to the new adequacy
theory and they were willing to fundamentally reconsider this
issue. This reconsideration was under the guise of a new legal
theory but nevertheless, from a broad historical sweep, it
demonstrates that when inequities persist, advocates will
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persevere and courts will be open to new arguments that are
based on fundamental principles of equity and fairness.
In sum, then, what I have described thus far is the manner
in which I see the fiscal equity cases of the 1990s relating
directly back to the legacy of Brown. We are using new and
different legal mechanisms, but we are carrying on the very
same battle. We have come to realize that the state courts in
these education adequacy cases are opening their doors, and
through these doors we are finding a great deal of potential for
finally realizing far-reaching education reforms.
Let me briefly describe the status of CFE and its
significance with respect to the education adequacy movement.
We are, in essence, attempting to turn a legal decision into a real
difference in children's lives and achievements. The New York
Court of Appeals ruled in our favor last June and it thereby
culminated ten years of preparation and litigation.
After the court of appeals rejected the motion to dismiss in
1995, we went back to trial. We had a seven-month trial, which
was an extraordinary undertaking. It allowed us to explore
every facet of the education system of New York City and the
State of New York. Also, we were able to investigate the
definition of what constitutes a "sound basic education," a phrase
the Court had used in Levittown, for defining children's rights
under Article XI of the State Constitution. Since under the
equity theory in that case, plaintiffs did not argue that students
in the poor district were being denied a minimum level of
education; their claim was that these children were being denied
a level of funding equal to what was being made available in
other districts. Thus, the court in Levittown had no occasion to
define what constitutes a sound basic education.
In our case, we came forward and pressed the education
adequacy argument. We based it on this language of a sound
basic education the court had used to articulate the core
educational rights contained in the New York State Constitution.
We argued that tens of thousands of children in New York City
were not getting their constitutional opportunity for a sound
basic education. After the court accepted this argument in CFE
I and allowed us to proceed to trial, defining precisely what was
a "sound basic education" became one of the most important
issues at the trial.
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In its 1995 decision, the court took a very innovative
approach to this definitional issue.
It issued a tentative
definition of what constitutes a sound basic education. The court
defined it in terms of the skills that students would need to be
civic participants capable of "voting and serving on a jury"-a
fascinating definition. Though it was not a final definition, it
served as a "template" to guide the trial judge in dealing with
these issues. The Court indicated that after evidence was
gathered on this issue at trial, it would review the record on
appeal and make a final determination as to what the definition
should be.
When you stop to consider what the court was doing, it
really was a fascinating new direction in constitutional law. The
highest court in the state was candidly writing a "first draft." It
was revealing its current thinking, but saying that it was open to
reconsidering that perspective based on the evidence and legal
arguments that would come forth at the trial. Courts, of course,
almost never speak in such an open manner.
I suspect that Judge Bellacosa and his colleagues, in issuing
that decision, assumed that at trial there would be a great deal
of input from educational experts and attorneys. What they may
not have known is that in fact we would use that ruling as a
starting point for the development of the state-wide public
engagement process. We reasoned that, if we ever won this case,
at the remedy stage we would have to deal with a range of
political issues. We wanted to avoid what happened in New
Jersey and other states. In our case, we had a special problem
since in New York there is obviously a history of
upstate/downstate splits when it comes to "nitty-gritty" issues
like funding education.
There also quite frankly was a
substantial amount of racist thinking that went on when some
people in Albany were determining how much money children in
New York City were going to receive. We therefore decided to
start a process of trying to commence a state-wide dialogue to
deal with some of these issues from the beginning.
We wondered how we might begin the dialogue process. The
court's sound basic education template gave us this wonderful
opening. We took this opportunity and went to communities
throughout New York City and throughout New York State. We
said, "[t]he highest court in the state has issued a challenge, and
we need your help to determine what this constitutional
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language truly means. This is too important for just the lawyers
and the experts to handle. Everybody has got a stake in this."
We received incredible input from citizens all over the state.
Quite frankly, this public input changed the original legal theory
that we and our colleagues had in mind. ("Our colleagues," of
course, mean the team of about ten attorneys at Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett, one of the major New York firms, who have
worked pro bono with us on this case for so many years. They
have added immeasurably to our legal team.) In any event, our
legal team was thinking in certain strategic directions, but when
we received input from the public engagement, we began
heading in an entirely different direction.
Defining what a sound basic education means came to the
forefront of our strategy. There is a great deal of language in the
1995 decision that repeatedly uses the word "minimum." Many
people who read this and some of the other early decisions of
state courts said, "[t]his adequacy concept may be a new legal
argument that can open some new possibilities for you. But,
ultimately, what were we going to get out of this case if
'adequacy' is defined in very minimal terms?" Is the definition of
adequacy going to cover the core issues of class sizes and the
qualification of teachers? Are we ever going to reach such
serious substantive questions, or is the court going to rule that
minimum means that merely that every child is guaranteed to
be in some building with some teacher and getting some excuse
for an education?
As the issue developed during trial, the State took the
position that sound basic education should be defined very
minimally. They actually argued that sound basic education in
the twenty-first century meant no more than an eighth grade
level education. The clause at issue was written in 1894. Going
back historically, they made the argument the intent of the
framers of that clause must have been no more than an eighth
grade education because in the nineteenth century, few people
went to secondary school.
We, of course, argued that the state's educational system
had to provide children with the skills to prepare themselves to
be capable citizens and to be effective employees in the twentyfirst century. As this case proceeded, the trial court decided in
our favor and went into great detail about the types of skills
children need to be competent workers and capable voters and
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jurors. These are high-level skills, indeed. The trial court
specifically found that jurors need to be able to interpret complex
campaign finance laws and to understand the significance of
DNA. There was no question that this represented a high and
challenging standard.
When we reached the appellate division, the position that an
eighth grade education would suffice prevailed. With respect to
skills for employment as a factor, the appellate division
specifically determined that the constitution guarantees only the
skills necessary to get a job and stay off welfare. If that is where
adequacy would be defined, what had we achieved for Bob
Jackson's children and other minority children in New York
City? Would we only be reinforcing segregation? Defining
adequacy in that way would mean that the city's schools would
have no greater obligation than to prepare children to flip
burgers while the children in Scarsdale were being prepared for
the college track.
Fortunately, the appellate division decision did not did not
ultimately prevail. In its 2002 decision, the court of appeals was
given an opportunity to look again at Brown and its historical
significance and the court did just that. I have no knowledge of
the confidential deliberations of the court, but what I can tell you
is that as we argued before those judges, I could tell from the eye
contact and body movements that they were listening. Notably,
we had put in our briefs that the final determination should
include provision for a "meaningful high school education."
I distinctly remember one of the judges grilling me
specifically on this phrase and saying, "Where do you get this
language 'meaningful high school education?'" I looked straight
at the judges and said, "Your honors, I am going to be very blunt
and honest with you. You have to adopt that phrase because you
have a responsibility as the highest court in the state to clarify
that, in the twenty-first century, eighth grade education is not
enough for the minority children in New York City. You have to,
in the strongest possible language, erase the impression that has
been left by that horrendous appellate court decision."
The judges of the court of appeals recognized the importance
of communicating to the broad public as well as the legal
profession that they were rejecting that totally unacceptable
view that urban students-largely minority students-can be
relegated to a nineteenth century eighth grade education. They
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unflinchingly held that all students in the state of New York are
indeed entitled to the opportunity for "a meaningful high school
education."
I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that in practical
terms this holding represents a very significant advance with
respect to implementing the original vision of Brown. Every
child in New York City-and 84% are minority right now-has a
constitutional right to the resources and the opportunities
necessary to receive a meaningful high school education. I leave
you with this note of optimism and the hope that the vision of
Brown continues to be carried on by other federal and state
courts, just as it has been carried on so nobly by the court of
appeals here in the State of New York.
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